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AVIATION LAW-D.C. CIRCUIT ALLOWS STAGE 2 NOISE
RESTRICTION YET DEFERS TO FAA'S INTERPRETATION
OF ANCA: CITY OF NAPLES AIRPORT AUTHORITY V. FED-
ERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
NELLIE STRONG*
T HE CITY OF NAPLES is a quiet retirement community in
southern Florida. But the daily games of croquet and
bridge are frequently interrupted by the loud engine roar of air-
planes landing at the local Naples airport. In order to create a
uniform process for airport proprietors to restrict such noise,
Congress passed the Airport Noise and Capacity Act ("ANCA" or
"the Act").' The Act was the product of significant compromise.
To appease airport proprietors and local residents of airport cit-
ies, Congress provided a permanent phase-out of Stage 2 aircraft
weighing more than 75,000 pounds by the end of 1999.2 To ap-
pease airlines, trade groups, unions, and plane and engine
builders, Congress placed significant procedural requirements
on Stage 2 restrictions and significant procedural and substan-
tive requirements on Stage 3 restrictions.
With its passage, however, two issues have arisen: (1) whether
the Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA") can review the sub-
stance of Stage 2 restrictions, even if the airport has complied
with all the procedural requirements of ANCA, and (2) whether
the FAA can still withhold grants for unreasonable Stage 2 re-
strictions under the Airport and Airway Improvement Act
("AAIA"). The FAA, as the federal agency in charge of imple-
menting ANCA, has attempted to answer these questions. To
* Nellie Strong earned her B.A. in political science from Principia College and
is currently a J.D. candidate at SMU Dedman School of Law, 2007. She would
like to thank her father for being her trustee and editor.
1 49 U.S.C. § 47521 (1990).
2 Id. § 47528. The FAA classifies the noise emitted by aircraft into one of three
categories: Stage I (the lotidest aircrafts, which were banned in 1987), Stage 2,
and Stage 3 (the quietest aircrafts).
Id. § 47524(b).
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the first issue, the FAA believes that its role is not only to ensure
that the procedural requirements of ANCA are met, but also to
provide a detailed review of the substance of the restriction.4
Thus, it believes that it can review Stage 2 restrictions for sub-
stance. To the second issue, the FAA believes that ANCA does
not supersede other laws.' In other words, the FAA believes it
can still withhold grants under AAIA, even if the airport has
complied with the procedural requirements. However, since
the adoption of ANCA and the FAA's interpretation, not one
local airport authority has been able to pass a noise restriction-
until the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals decided City of Naples
Airport Authority v. FAA.6
In 1999, the Naples Airport Authority, after receiving several
complaints a month from residents, examined noise exposure in
the area.7 The study found that, by restricting all Stage 2 air-
craft, only 1% of aircraft operations would be affected, and the
number of people exposed to 60 decibels (dB) of noise or more
would diminish considerably.8 Thus, the Airport Authority com-
pleted the extensive procedural requirements for a Stage 2 re-
striction and began enforcing the ban on January 1, 2001V
This ban faced numerous challenges-by airlines, trade
groups, cargo haulers, unions, and plane and engine builders-
all of whom desired a less regulated air industry. First, the FAA
initiated an enforcement action against Naples, claiming that
the Stage 2 ban violated ANCA because of defects in the eco-
nomic study required by ANCAY° Once Naples corrected those
defects by a supplemental study, however, the FAA stated that
the airport had satisfied the procedural requirements of ANCA
and dropped its enforcement action." Second, the National
4 Peter Irvine, Note, The Future of Stage 2 Airport Noise Restrictions: A Matter of
Substantive Versus Procedural Review by the Federal Aviation Admiistration, 11 GEO.
MASON L. REv. 179, 203 (2002) (citing Letter from Louise E. Maillett, FAA Acting
Associate Administrator for Airports, to Rebecca Zwart, Minneapolis Metropoli-
tan Airport Commission (June 9, 1999)).
5 Id. at 206 (citing Letter from Frederick M. Isaac, FAA Regional Administrator
of the Nortwest Mountain Region, to Francesca Hammer, President of the Jack-
son Hole Airport board (Jan. 19, 1996)).
6 City of Naples Airport Auth. v. FAA, 409 F.3d 431 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
7 Id. at 433.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Aimee Kratovil, Comment, The Airport Noise & Capacity Act of 1990: Superflu-
ous Hurdle for Airport Proprietors Who Have Assured Federal Grants, 12 PENN ST.
ENVTL. L. REv. 499, 510-11 (2004).
11 Id.
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Business Aviation Association ("NBAA") and the General Avia-
tion Manufacturers Association ("GAMA") sued Naples, claim-
ing that the Stage 2 restriction was preempted by federal law
under the Supremacy Clause and that it violated the reasonable-
ness and nondiscrimination requirements of the Commerce
Clause. 12 The court ruled in favor of Naples, holding that the
Stage 2 ban was not preempted by federal law and was not un-
reasonable or discriminatory."3 In October of 2001, the FAA ini-
tiated a second enforcement action to terminate the Airport
Authority's ability to receive federal grants under AAIA."1 The
FAA found that (1) the FAA was not bound to the prior court
decision in NBAA under the doctrine of res judicata, (2) ANCA
has no effect on grant assurance obligations under AAIA, and
(3) the Stage 2 restriction is unreasonable.' 5 The Airport Au-
thority appealed this decision. 16
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals only commented on the
latter two holdings of the FAA. 17 First, the court deferred to the
FAA's interpretation of ANCA-that the FAA may still withhold
grants under AAIA when an airport operator imposes an unrea-
sonable Stage 2 noise restriction. 18 The court found that ANCA
was ambiguous on this issue and that the FAA's interpretation of
the relationship between the two laws was permissible.'9 Sec-
ond, the court held that the restriction on Stage 2 aircraft was
reasonable." In response to the FAA's claim that Naples does
not believe that 60 dB is a significant noise level, the court
pointed to a city ordinance forbidding noise in excess of 60
dB.21 In response to the FAA's claim that Naples is not uniquely
quiet, the court discovered that the FAA did not define uniquely
quiet, did not visit Naples as part of its investigation, and did not
conduct its own sound analysis.22 On the other hand, Naples
offered evidence that the community is a quiet retirement
neighborhood and that its economy is based upon that particu-
12 Nat'l Bus. Aviation Ass'n v. City of Naples Airport Auth., 162 F. Supp. 2d
1343, 1346 (M.D. Fla. 2001).
11 Id. at 1353-54.
14 Kratovil, supra note 10, at 515-22.
15 Id.
1lb City of Naples Airport Auth. v. FAA, 409 F.3d 431 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
17 Id. at 433-35.
i8 Id. at 435.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 436.
21 Id. at 435.
22 Id. at 436.
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lar environment. 23 Thus, the court permitted the Stage 2 re-
striction.2 While the court reached the correct outcome in
permitting the Naples Stage 2 restriction, it erred in deferring to
the FAA's interpretation of ANCA.
In deferring to the FAA's interpretation, the court relied on
Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council.2 5 In that case, the
U.S. Supreme Court held that if a law is ambiguous and the gov-
erning federal agency suggests a permissible interpretation then
that interpretation will be given effect. 26 Under the Chevron
analysis, the first inquiry is whether Congress spoke to the is-
sue.27 If Congress' intent is clear on the issue, then that intent
must be upheld.28 Intent can be determined by natural mean-
ing, legislative history, and purpose.29 If the intent is unclear,
the second inquiry is whether the federal agency's interpreta-
tion is permissible. In this case, Congress' intent was clear: (1)
to pass a Stage 2 restriction, an airport proprietor has to submit
only to procedural requirements, not to a substantive review by
the FAA, and (2) the FAA cannot deny federal funding to air-
ports with Stage 2 restrictions under AAIA.
First, the plain language of ANCA makes clear that airport
proprietors need only to perform certain procedural require-
ments to pass a Stage 2 restriction. The airport proprietors must
(1) publish the proposed restriction 180 days before the effec-
tive date and (2) make available for public comment an analysis
of the anticipated costs and benefits of the restriction, a descrip-
tion of alternative restrictions, and a comparison of the costs
and benefits of the alternative measures to the costs and benefits
of the proposed restriction. 3' The FAA regulations provide the
details of the analysis and notice requirements.3 2 All of these
requirements are procedural. Stage 3 restrictions, however, are
expressly subject to substantive review. These restrictions can
only become effective if either all aircraft operators at that air-
port or the Secretary of Transportation approve.33 In approv-
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 434-35.





31 49 U.S.C. § 47524(b) (1990).
32 14 C.F.R. § 161 (1991).
33 49 U.S.C. § 47524(c) (1990).
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ing, the Secretary considers whether the restriction is
reasonable, non-arbitrary, and non-discriminatory. 4 Because
Congress explicitly required FAA approval of Stage 3 restrictions
but did not require such approval of Stage 2 restrictions, Con-
gress clearly intended to allow airport operators to promulgate
Stage 2 restrictions free from FAA review.
Further, the plain language of ANCA makes clear that it
supercedes AAIA. The AAIA is the means through which the
federal government supports state and local airport operation.
Airport proprietors can receive grant funds in return for "grant
assurances," which obligate proprietors to comply with policies
of the federal government.3 5 The first assurance is that "the air-
port will be available for public use on reasonable conditions
and without unjust discrimination. 31 6 If an airport violates this
promise, the FAA may suspend federal grant funds.37 Fortu-
nately, ANCA specifically addresses its relationship to previous
laws such as AAIA. It states "except as provided by section 47524
of this title, this subchapter does not affect" law currently in ef-
fect relating to airport noise or the authority of the Secretary of
Transportation to seek and obtain legal remedies where appro-
priate.3 Thus, section 47524, which sets forth the requirements
for Stage 2 and Stage 3 restrictions, does affect law currently in
place. The FAA can no longer suspend federal funds for unrea-
sonable noise restrictions. As one author stated, section 47524
"provides" something; "it provides its own self-contained regula-
tory structure for reviewing Stage 2 and 3 restrictions."3 9
The court overlooked this section. Instead, the court focused
on section 47524(e) of ANCA, which states that an airport with a
Stage 3 restriction is eligible for grants under AAJA if the restric-
tion has been approved by the Secretary of Transportation or
agreed to by all the aircraft operators.40 In other words, the FAA
cannot withhold grants on the basis of approved Stage 3 noise
restrictions. The court argued that, because there is no such
similar provision for Stage 2 restrictions, Congress intended to
continue to allow the FAA to withhold grants for Stage 2 restric-
tions, even if the airport operator complied with the procedural
:14 Id. § 47524(c) (2).
35 49 U.S.C. § 47107(a) (1982).
m Id.
37 Id. § 47107.
M 49 U.S.C. § 47533 (1990).
39 Irvine, supra note 4, at 208.
4, 49 U.S.C. § 47524(e) (1990).
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requirements.4" However, section 47533 made clear that Con-
gress did not intend current law to continue to apply to section
47524 restrictions. Because previous law does not govern sec-
tion 47254, to the extent that Congress wanted previous law to
apply, it had to write it into that section. Section 47524(e) is
such an example, making clear Congress' intent that airports
with Stage 3 restrictions still receive the benefits of AAIA.
Second, the legislative intent of ANCA makes it clear that the
FAA cannot perform substantive review of Stage 2 restrictions or
deny federal funding to Stage 2 restrictions under AAIA. Dur-
ing Senate debate on the bill, Senator Frank Lautenberg asked
Senator Wendell Ford whether "under this proposal, an airport
operator would be allowed to impose restrictions on Stage 2 op-
erations, without the approval of the FAA, and without risking
loss of ... money. ' 42 Ford, the Chairman of the Aviation Sub-
committee, replied that the Senator was correct on both
points.4" Thus, the members of Congress, before voting, were
clear on the facts that, under ANCA, the FAA could not review
Stage 2 restrictions and could not deny federal funding for such
restrictions. Further, the early versions of ANCA required ap-
proval by the FAA for Stage 2 restrictions.4 4 However, the Con-
ference Committee removed that requirement before the
legislation was passed. Thus, Congress specifically considered
such a substantive review for Stage 2 restrictions and rejected it.
The court also considered this evidence, but did not give it
weight because it does not deal with the FAA's pre-existing
power to withhold grants under AAIA.4 ' However, the previ-
ously discussed evidence is relevant to that issue. The question-
ing between the Senators implicitly refers to the FAA's pre-
existing power to withhold grants. Senator Lautenberg asked
the question because of the FAA's pre-existing ability to withhold
grants based on unreasonable restrictions. He wanted to clarify
whether ANCA would change that power. And Senator Ford
confirmed that the FAA had indeed lost that ability; airport pro-
prietors could now pass Stage 2 restrictions without such a loss
of federal funding. Because this evidence of legislative intent
implicitly deals with the FAA's pre-existing power to withhold
41 City of Naples Airport Auth. v. FAA, 409 F.3d 431, 434 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
42 136 CONG. REc. 36, 252 (1990) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg).
43 136 CONG. REc. 36, 252 (1990) (statement of Sen. Ford).
-4 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, S. 3209, 101st Cong. § 3202(a)
(1990).
45 City of Naples, 409 F.3d at 434.
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grants under the AAIA, the court should have given this evi-
dence more weight.
Third, the purpose of ANCA has been thwarted by the FAA's
interpretation. When ANCA was passed, each local airport
passed its own restriction on noise levels.4" Congress found that
"community noise concerns have led to uncoordinated and in-
consistent restrictions on aviation that could impede the na-
tional air transportation system" and thus "a noise policy must
be carried out at the national level."47 In passing ANCA, Con-
gress certainly intended airports to pass restrictions-just at the
national rather than the local level. But the FAA's interpreta-
tion has led to just one Stage 2 restriction in fifteen years, the
one in Naples. Certainly this is not what Congress envisioned.
Between the plain language, legislative intent, and purpose of
ANCA, it is clear that Congress intended Stage 2 restrictions to
be passed without substantive review by the FAA and without the
loss of AAIA funding. Thus, under Chevron, the court should
not have given deference to the FAA's interpretation of ANCA.
However, even if the Congressional intent was unclear, the
FAA's interpretation of ANCA is not permissible because of its
effects. First, the FAA's interpretation creates a burdensome
and costly two-step process for Stage 2 restrictions. Airport pro-
prietors must first complete the procedural requirements, which
involve a costly economic study. In fact, the requirements are so
burdensome that Naples is the only airport that has been able to
complete them.48 After completing those requirements, the air-
port proprietors then must get the approval of the FAA. This
interpretation makes ANCAjust a procedural hurdle to restrict-
ing Stage 2 aircraft. Second, this interpretation undermines the
compromise that ANCA was, making it only beneficial to the air-
line industry. By using AAIA to get substantive review of Stage 2
restrictions, "the FAA has attempted to assert authority through
the back door that Congress never gave to the agency. This as-
sertion of authority is unprecedented and upsets the balance be-
tween federal and local control that Congress and the courts
have carefully struck."49 And finally, the FAA's negative attitude
toward Stage 2 restrictions, coupled with its ability to review for
substance all Stage 2 restrictions, has intimidated airport propri-
46 49 U.S.C. § 47521(2) (1990).
17 49 U.S.C. § 47521(2), (3) (1990).
48 Irvine, supra note 4, at 200.
49 Kratovil, supra note 10, at 522-23.
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etors from attempting to enact such restrictions.5" As one au-
thor stated, "through this substantive review, the FAA
discourages the enactment of restrictions by threatening the sus-
pension of a proprietor's eligibility to receive airport improve:
ment funds."51
Overall, while the court reached the correct outcome by al'
lowing the Stage 2 restriction, the court erred in deferring to
the FAA's interpretation of ANCA. The plain language, legisla-
tive intent, and purpose of ANCA indicate Congress' intent: (1)
airport proprietors have to satisfy only certain procedural re-
quirements to pass a Stage 2 restriction, and (2) the FAA cannot
deny federal funding for unreasonable Stage 2 restrictions
under AAIA. Thus, the court should not have deferred to the
FAA's opposing interpretation. Even if Congress' intent is am-
biguous, the FAA's interpretation of ANCA is not permissible
because of the undesirable effects. It makes ANCA a costly hur-
dle to Stage 2 restrictions. It undermines the compromise
reached between airport proprietors and the airline industry.
And it has further intimidated airport proprietors from attempt-
ing to restrict Stage 2 aircraft. So while the residents of Naples
can again enjoy their quiet games of bridge and shuffleboard,
other residents of airport cities will most likely not enjoy such
peace and quiet.
50 See Irvine, supra note 4, at 213.
51 Id.
